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CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA, INC.
v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
91 E 3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996).
I. FACTS
The City of Philadelphia (City) and intervening
defendant United Minority Enterprise Associates (UMEA)
appealed from -t2e district court's judgment declaring
that the City's set-aside program for black construction
contractors, Chapter 17-5001 violated the equal protection rights of the Contractors Association of Eastern
Pennsylvania (CAEP) and eight other contracting associations (Contractors) .2
The preamble to Chapter 17-500 set forth general legislative findings, including the percentage of minorities in
Philadelphia. The legislature found that "[a] pattern of past
and present racial, sexual and economic discrimination have
unfairly limited the ability of Minority and Female Owned
Businesses to compete for an equitable share of such contracts with the City of Philadelphia"; that the citizens of
Philadelphia are committed to the eradication of such discrimination; that goals for minority and female owned businesses would help eradicate the manifestations of discrimination.3 The preamble to the 1987 ordinance, which extended the life of the program, included the finding that economic parity with majority businesses had not yet been reached.'
Chapter 17-500 seeks to increase the participation of
"disadvantaged business enterprises" (DBEs) in city contracting.5 DBEs are defined as those business at least 51%
owned by "socially and economically disadvantaged" persons.6 "Socially and economically disadvantaged persons"
are "individuals who have ... been subjected to racial, sexual or ethnic prejudice because of their identity as a member of a group of differential treatment because of their
handicap without regard to their individual qualities, and
whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has
been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same business area
who are not socially disadvantaged."7 This definition
'Phila.
Code § 17-500 et. seq.
2
ContractorsAss'n of Eastern Pa.v. City of Philadelphia,
91 E3d 586, 590-91 (3d Cir. 1996).
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Contractors,91 E3d at 591.
4
Id.
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Id.
6Id.

7Id. (quoting Phila. Code § 17-501011).

"includes only individuals who are both the victims of
prejudice based on status and economically deprived."'8
Businesses majority-owned by racial minorities (minority
business enterprises or MBEs) and women are rebuttably
presumed to be DBEs, per § 17-501(1 1)(a), but businesses
that have received more than $5 million in City contracts
are rebuttably presumed not to be DBEs. 9 Chapter 17-500
sets the participation goals of: 15% for racial minorities,
10% for women, and 2% for handicapped.' These perecentages include the dollars received by DBE subcontractors as well as the monies granted to DBE prime contractors.II
Two different strategies are authorized to achieve
the program's goals. 12 When there are sufficient DBE's
qualified to perform a city contract to ensure competitive bidding, a contract can be let on a sheltered market
basis - i.e., only DBE's will be permitted to bid. 3 In
other instances, the contract will be let on a non-sheltered basis - i.e., any firm may bid - with the goals
4
requirements being met through subcontracting.
Because the sheltered market strategy has seldom been
used, the Ordinance's participation goals have been
achieved almost entirely by insisting that bidding prime
contractors subcontract work to DBE's in accordance
with the goals.'5 Chapter 17-500 is, therefore, essentially
a subcontracting set-aside program.'6
When the goals are to be achieved by imposing subcontracting requirements, each would-be prime contractor must submit a "Schedule for Participation" of DBEs or
a "Request for Waiver." 7 A schedule lists the participating
DBE subcontractors and the dollar value of their services, whereas a waiver is a way to avoid the DBE
requirements. 8 The Request for Waiver lists the DBEs
they have commitments from and contains a statement
that the contractor has made a good faith effort to enlist
DBEs but has failed to meet the goals for the contract. 9
8

Id.

9Id. at 591-92.

'ld.at 592.
"Id. The 1982 Ordinance created the Minority Business
Enterprise Council (MBEC) to oversee the program. Id. The
MBEC also had the power to recommend exemptions from
Chapter 17-500's requirements. Id.
12Id.
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Compliance with the Chapter 17-500's goals is to be
considered "an element of responsiveness" of the bid
when an agency awards a contract.20 When at least one
bidding contractor submits a satisfactory Schedule for
Participation, it is presumed that all contractors who did
not submit a satisfactory Schedule did not exert good
faith efforts to meet the program goals, and the "lowest
responsible, responsive contractor" who is granted a
Waiver and proposes the highest level of DBE participation at a reasonable price recieves the contract. 21The pre22
sumption can be rebutted by noncomplying bidders.
II. HOLDING
After trial, the United States District Court issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance. 23 The United States Court of Appeals for the 3rd
Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Philadelphia.2 4 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Judge Stapleton held that the city failed
to demonstrate race-based discrimination on the part of
general contractors or local trade associations.As to the city,
the set aside program was not narrowly tailored to address
such past discrimination even if it could be shown."
III.ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
In evaluating the Philadelphia program, the United
States Court of Appeals applied the strict scrutiny test articulated in Wygantla and Croson.I Wygant held that parties
challenging a race-based preference can succeed by showing either (1) that the subjective intent of the legislative
body was not to remedy race discrimination in which the
municipality played a role, or (2) that there is no strong
basis in evidence for the conclusions the race-based discrimination existed and that the remedy chosen was necessary'm Croson held that municipal, race-based, affirmative
action programs, when challenged on equal protection
grounds, must be subjected to strict scrutiny review. 9

0
1d.at 593.
21id.
22Id.
231d.
241d. at 586.
251d.
"Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267

(1986).
'7City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469

(1989).
"Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277.
"Croson, 488 U.S. at 470.
30Id.
"Contractors,91 F3d at 599.
321d.
33Id.

In Croson, the Supreme Court stated that, in order to
pass the strict scrutiny test, a minority set-aside program
must be justified by a compelling government interest
and narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial purpose."°The strict scrutiny test requires that the City must
specifically identify the discrimination giving rise to the
compelling state interest in a race-based classification.3
Over the course of the litigation, the city pointed to
three distinct forms of discrimination, discrimination by
prime contractors in the awarding of subcontracts, discrimination by contractor associations in admitting
members, and discrimination by the City in awarding of
32
prime contracts.
The Contractors Court found no firm evidence of discrimination in regard to the prime contractors or contractor associations." To show discrimination by the city, at
3
trial, it relied upon a study by Dr. Andrew Brimmer. 1
According to Brimmer's analysis,"black construction firms
would have to have received approximately 4.5 times
more public works dollars than they did receive in order
to have achieved an amount proportionate to their representation among all construction."3 1 He arrived at that figure by calculating a disparity index of 22.5 for black construction firms."According to Dr. Brimmer, the smaller
the index figure, the greater the inference of discrimination.17 He concluded that such a large disparity was
attributable to the city's discrimination against black
3
contractors. 1
In certain circumstances, a disparity index of 22.5
can constitute a strong basis in evidence for inferring the
existence of discrimination. 3 The district court, however, rejected Dr. Brimmer's conclusion for three reasons:
it did not take into account whether the black construction firms were qualified and willing to perform City
contracts; it used mixed statistical data from different
sources; and it did not account for the "neutral" explanation that qualified black firms were too preoccupied
with large, federally-assisted projects to perform City projects. 40 The Court of Appeals dismissed the District

3'd.
35id.
"6Id.at 602.
7
1 Disparity index formula: ($ to MBE's / $ on all prime contracts) x 100 / (# MBE's / total # of contractors) = Index.
'Contractors, 91 F.3d at 595.
3See Associated General Contractors of Cal.v.Coalition
for Economic Equity,950 E2d 1401,1414 (9th Cir.1991) (finding disparity equivalent to index of 22.4 sufficient to raise inference of discrimination), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct.
1670, 118 L.Ed.2d 390 (1992); Cone Corp. v.Hillsborough
County, 908 E2d 908, 916 (11 th Cir.) (finding disparity equivalent to index of approximately 50 sufficient to make a prima
facie case), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 983, 111 S.Ct. 516, 112
L.Ed.2d. 528 (1990).
"'Contractors,91 E3d at 602-03.

Court's first two contentions and said the third was a
close call.4" They did not decide on the third contention,
however, because they found that the program was not
narrowly tailored to remedy the discrimination, assuming they could find discrimination.42
To the extent that the evidence suggests racial discrimination has occurred, it suggests that the City discriminated against black prime contractors capable of
bidding on prime City construction contracts.43 To be
constitutionally permissible, the program must be narrowly tailored to address the discrimination shown, i.e.,
the remedy chosen must have been made necessary by
that discrimination." Consequently, in so far as the program affects the subcontracting market, it is not narrowly tailored to address discrimination by the City in the
market for prime contracts."
The District Court found, and the record supports,
that prior to adopting Chapter 17-500, the City Council
never attempted to determine the scope of the injury it
was allegedly seeking to remedy.46 The legislative history
suggested that the benchmarks for the program were
derived solely from the general population of minorities
and women in Philadelphia.4 7 The Third Curcuit concluded that the City was never able to provide an evidentiary
basis from which to conclude that the 15% set-aside was
necessary to remedy discrimination against black contractors in the market for prime contracts.48 The Brimmer
Study actually suggested that, at most, only 0.7% of the
construction firms qualified to perform City-financed
prime contracts in the pre-ordinance period were black
49
construction firms.
In finding that the Richmond program was not narrowly tailored, the Croson Court considered it significant

that the race-neutral remedial alternatives were available
and the City did not consider using these means to
increase minority business participation in City contracting.50 The district court here, likewise, found that
there were race-neutral alternatives that would likely
5
contribute to the alleviation of the perceived problem.
The Court considered such alternatives important as
their use would reduce the hardship to non-minority
contractors. 52 The Third Curcuit concluded that there
was ample support for the finding that alternatives to
race-based preferences were available at the time the legislation was passed that would have been race neutral or,
53
at least, less burdensome to non-minority contractors.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Hunter v. Regents of the University of
54
California,
the U.S. District Court stated that in
Contractors, the Third Circuit based its holding on an
intepretation of Croson previously rejected by the
District Court in California.5 5 They claimed that because
the Supreme Court stated that strict scrutiny is not "strict
in theory, but fatal in fact," there must be other constitutional means of race-conscious decisionmaking besides
56
simply remedying past discrimination.
The Hunter Court seems to assume that the application of strict scrutiny review is fatal to affirmative action
programs. Strict scrutiny review, however, only requires
legislators and policy-makers to more carefully craft programs which attempt to redress discrimination. The program, according to Contractors, must specifically address
demonstrated discrimination. Additionally, Contractors
suggests that race-neutral alternatives must be considered.
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